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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-2781
___________
JEROME SEASONWEIN,
                                
                                                                                        Appellant                         
   v.
FIRST MONTAUK SECURITIES CORP
                                                             
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey
(No. 03-cv-00459)
District Judge: Hon. Anne E. Thompson
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on March 10, 2009
Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: March 30, 2009)
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Jerome Seasonwein brought this suit against First Montauk Securities, alleging
that he was terminated because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in
2Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1 et seq.  On October 27, 2003,
District Judge Anne Thompson granted First Montauk’s motion for summary judgment
on the ADEA claim and dismissed the NJLAD claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.  Seasonwein appealed, and we reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment insofar as it dismissed Seasonwein’s claim of disparate treatment under the
ADEA, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment insofar as it dismissed his claim of
disparate impact.  Seasonwein v. First Montauk Secs. Corp., 189 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir.
2006).  The case was remanded back to the district court and a jury trial ensued.  The jury
decided in favor of First Montauk, returning a verdict of no liability.  
Seasonwein now appeals two evidentiary decisions made by the district judge
during the trial.  For the reasons addressed below, we will affirm.
I.  
Because we write exclusively for the parties, we only discuss the facts and
proceedings to the extent necessary for the resolution of this case.  
Jerome Seasonwein worked at First Montauk from May 1999 to March 2002.  He
was sixty when he was hired.  During that time, he worked principally as a compliance
officer, save a four month stint when he worked as a trader. 
In late 2000, First Montauk’s business went into steep decline.  Between
September 2000 and October 2002, First Montauk laid off twenty-seven employees,
We derive our jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 1
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representing nearly 25% of its workforce.  Seasonwein was among those affected:  he was
laid off in February 2002, during the third round of layoffs.  
First Montauk offered a severance package to its laid-off workers in exchange for
a general release and waiver of all claims against First Montauk.  In February 2002,
Seasonwein was given this offer, and after ten days of consideration, accepted the
severance package.  The release signed by Seasonwein, however, did not contain
language required by the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA), 29 U.S.C. §
626, a statute that aims to protect older workers from unknowingly and involuntarily
waiving ADEA claims.  Because the release did not strictly comply with the OWBPA,
Judge Thompson held the release ineffective, and permitted Seasonwein to pursue his
claims against First Montauk.
II. 
Seasonwein presents two issues on appeal, both of which concern the admission of
evidence.   The trial judge’s rulings will be reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Stecyk v.1
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing General Elec. Co.
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1997)).
First, Seasonwein argues that the trial judge erred in admitting the ages of all
twenty-seven employees laid off by First Montauk between September 2000 and October
2002.  First Montauk sought to admit this information to demonstrate that employees of
4all ages were let go in roughly equal numbers.  Seasonwein asked the court to only admit
the ages of the laid-off traders, as the majority of the laid-off traders were over forty. 
The trial judge’s decision to admit the demographic evidence of all the laid-off
employees – not just the traders – was not an abuse of discretion.  Although Seasonwein
was licenced as a trader, the evidence presented before the court showed that Seasonwein
spent the majority of his time at First Montauk working as a compliance officer/analyst,
not as a trader.  Accordingly, the trial judge was well within her discretion to determine
that demographic evidence relating to all of the employees laid off – both traders and
non-traders – was relevant to Seasonwein’s claims of discrimination.   
Second, Seasonwein argues that the district judge inappropriately permitted First
Montauk to admit evidence regarding a general release entered into by Seasonwein and
First Montauk.  Seasonwein’s principal argument is that the release should have been
barred pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 408 as a settlement document.  Here, too,
there was no abuse of discretion.  At the time Seasonwein signed the release, he had not
yet alleged – or even considered alleging – any claims against First Montauk.  As a result,
the agreement signed by Seasonwein merely affected a general release – it did not settle
any specific claims, as there were no claims at issue that could have been settled.  Other
circuit courts have drawn a distinction between actual claims and potential claims, and
have found that in the case of potential claims, “the policy behind Rule 408 does not
come into play.”  See, e.g., Cassino v. Reichold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1343 (9th
Seasonwein also argues that the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Tyler v. Union Oil Co.2
of California, 304 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2002) supports his argument that the release was
inadmissible.  To the contrary, in Tyler the Fifth Circuit held that a similar release which
violated the OWBPA could be admitted to show the state of mind of the plaintiff that
signed the release.  Id. at 391. 
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Cir. 1987).  The district judge did not abuse her discretion in following this line of
reasoning.   2
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
